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Key messages:  
 We have developed and applied an approach of path dependence analysis that seemed helpful 
in making sense of the persistence of hospital-centrism in China between 1949 and 2018.  
 We have identified two main cycles of path dependence involving a process of “critical juncture 
— post-juncture development — conjuncture — post-juncture development” since 1949, which 
started with reinforcement of hospitals’ central role in the health system and resulted in the 
contemporary professional, financial, governance-related and organizational institutions 
underlying the balance between hospitals and primary care providers.  
 As revisionary conjunctures face many challenges of pre-existing hospital dominance, a 
primary care coalition with strong professional, bureaucratic and community stakes is the key 
solution to primary care strengthening in China.  
 It is important to understand the history of health systems in China, where the challenges of 
health systems strengthening go beyond limited resources and include different developmental 
paths as compared to Western countries.  
An abbreviated running title: path dependence of hospital dominance in China 
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Abstract 
Although China’s community health system helped inspire the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration on Health for 
All, it currently faces the challenge of strengthening primary care in response to hospital sector 
dominance. As the world reaffirms its commitment towards primary health services, China’s recent 
history provides a salient case study of the issues at stake in optimizing the balance of care. Here we 
have employed path dependence analysis to explain China’s co-evolution of hospital and primary care 
facilities between 1949 and 2018. We have identified two cycles of path dependent development (1949-
1978, 1978-2018) involving four sets of institutions related to medical professionalization, financing, 
organisation and governance of health facilities. Both cycles started with a critical juncture amid a 
radically changing societal context, when institutions favouring hospitals were initiated or renewed, 
leading to a process of self-reinforcement empowering the hospitals. Later in each cycle, events occurred 
that modified this hospital dominance. However, pro-primary-care policies during these conjunctures 




consolidation of hospital authority over the long term. These recurrent constraints suggest that primary 
care strengthening is unlikely to be successful without a comprehensive set of policy reforms, 
coordinated and sustained over a prolonged period. Our findings imply that it is important to understand 
the history of health systems in China, where the challenges of health systems strengthening go beyond 
limited resources and include different developmental paths as compared to Western countries.  
 
Introduction 
The Astana Declaration on Primary Health Care reaffirmed the world’s commitment to primary 
health care at the fortieth anniversary of the 1978 Declaration of Alma Ata (Global Conference 2018). 
However, the development of primary care in many low- and middle-income countries faces competition 
with hospitals for resources (World Health Organization 2008). China has historically provided 
inspiration for international efforts to strengthen primary care (Litsios 2015). Yet, in recent years efforts 
to shift the concentration of services and resources in China from hospitals towards primary care have 
failed (Ma, Wang et al. 2019, Xu and Mills 2019, Yip, Fu et al. 2019). 
Our article aims to analyse the evolution of the balance between hospital and primary care facilities 
in China between 1949 and 2018 from a historical perspective. As Berridge (2011) points out, historical 
studies can illuminate the processes and relations of power that have moulded the present. Within health 
systems research, an awareness of history is increasingly recommended so that policy formulation is 
alert to historically-influenced dynamics (Bloom 2014). Exploration of the historical drivers of hospital 
dominance therefore provides potentially interesting insights into the underlying challenges facing 
primary care strengthening. While the focus is China, this study might yield insights for other settings 
that face similar challenges.  
Early historiography of national or comparative health systems concentrated on the structural 
features of modernisation that brought into being social insurance systems and organised access to health 
services. Yet neither industrialisation, nor demographic transition, nor the social forces they unleashed, 
have proven sufficient to explain the timing of their emergence, nor the diversity of health system 
organisation (Aaron 1967, Collier and Messick 1975, Flora and Alber 1981). More compelling in recent 
years has been the institutionalist perspective, which instead of treating the state as a neutral setting for 
conflict between different social formations, sees it rather as an autonomous actor driving events (Hacker 
1998). Related to this is path dependence theory, derived from the economics of innovation, and 
attractive to cross-disciplinary scholars because it proposes generic processes.  
At base is the idea that an early ‘critical juncture’ in policy sets in motion ‘feedback effects’ that 
make the ensuing path hard to break away from. The ‘increasing returns’ of a policy choice might include 
popular accustomisation, expansionary momentum driven by bureaucrats, institutional adaptation, and 
invested civil society lobby groups (Pierson 1993, Hacker 1998, Pierson and Skocpol 2002). Through 
these, policy ‘lock-in’ occurs, so that even when sub-optimal features become apparent, the political 
costs of change appear greater than that of persistence. Current policy choices are therefore 
circumscribed by previous decisions (Pierson 2000). Potentially, we may apply path dependence 
approaches to understand China’s balance of care. 
What is at stake in transposing this analytical mode, derived from the Western democracies, onto 
China post-1949? Differences in governing structures and the role of civil society mean that a 
comparable pluralistic arena of policy-making does not obtain. Nonetheless, several studies have taken 
long-run approaches to charting the emergence of China’s hospitals and primary care that are compatible 
with path dependence analysis. For example, Renshaw’s study of China’s hospital system since the 
nineteenth century showed how patient preferences for institutional care resulted from a long process of 
acculturation (Renshaw 2014). Lucas demonstrated ‘policy continuities’ in community care, from 
interwar social medicine experiments up until the Cultural Revolution (Lucas 1982). Our own earlier 




and its limited capacity to meet public health needs of its large population as rural development became 
prioritized (Xu, Gorsky et al. 2019). Duckett’s study of health welfare policy since Mao demonstrated 
that different levels of institutionalization led to contrasting outcomes of urban and rural health financing, 
when government attempted to cut back on welfare provision (Duckett 2012). Finally, path dependence 
has been invoked to characterise an Asian ‘market-Leninist’ welfare regime, where socialist traits are 
carried forward into the commercialization era after economic reform (London 2014).  
There are therefore reasonable empirical grounds for pursuing this approach in the Chinese context.  
We stress at the outset that our account concentrates on the role of state institutions in shaping the 
configuration of services, and within the confines of a short article do not attempt to span the full range 
of factors.  These range from the contextual – such the pace of economic growth and the developmental 
trajectory of the biomedical profession – to the role of individual agency. Next, we elaborate our 
framework and methodology. 
Methods 
Path dependence analysis  
We draw from previous path dependence analyses and adopt the concepts of “critical junctures”, 
“conjunctures” and “post-juncture development” for the temporal framing of historical processes. Here, 
critical junctures refer to important windows of opportunity, driven by changes mainly outside of health 
systems that require adaption of health policies and system actors. Despite likely strong resistance 
against policy changes, there can also be “conjunctures”, where the coming together of events 
substantially challenge or even reverse existing policies (Wilsford 1994). Hence, conjunctures here refer 
to health policy windows opened by deliberate changes that revise the previous balance between 
hospitals and primary care facilities. During the intervals between the key policy episodes (i.e. critical 
junctures and conjunctures), the internal processes of the previous systems, dubbed by Tuohy (1999) 
“system logics”, play out. In our study, post-juncture development refers to the downstream events that 
follow the critical junctures or conjunctures. 
Table 1. Analytical steps for path dependence analysis  
Step Content 
1 Clarify the unit of analysis 
2 Clarify chronological scope and periodization 
3 Extraction of historical background 
4 Extraction of political structure 
5 Preliminary identification of main actors and extraction of their actions and interactions 
during the periods of interest 
6 Identify “candidate” critical junctures and select for analysis the most consequential critical 
junctures 
7 Identify “candidate” conjunctures and select for analysis the most consequential conjunctures 
8 Reconstruct the key historical processes following their temporal sequence 
Source: adapted from (Capoccia 2015) with substantial modification 
We applied a protocol as shown in Table 1, modified from Capoccia’s suggested approach to critical 
juncture analysis (Capoccia 2015), and conducted our analysis iteratively. Our units of analysis are the 
complex of professional, organizational, financial and governance institutions related to hospitals and 
primary care providers, which constituted the key components in the coevolution of both types of facility. 




their actions and interactions. Next, we identified critical junctures and conjunctures. The remaining 
temporal segments in between were categorized as post-juncture development periods. Lastly, we 
reconstructed the key historical process using the structure provided, following their temporal sequence. 
We now describe how we segmented the history and identified key periods, along with a brief account 
of the historical context. 
Economic and political background 
Our analysis starts with the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, after which China 
moved from post-war restoration to launching an urban-focused industrialization scheme in 1953. As 
we will demonstrate, 1949-1953 constituted a critical juncture, as an urban hospital focus was established 
in the new republic. A planned economy was developed with a profound urban-rural divide, in which 
social welfare was largely exclusive to the urban population. In the late 1960s, the country’s leaders 
emphasized egalitarian ideology and advocated class struggle as the central policy (MacFarquhar and 
Fairbank 1987, MacFarquhar and Fairbank 1991), introducing a conjuncture (1965-1968) when rural 
primary medical services extended nationwide.  
The analysis is punctuated by the year 1978, which marked China’s historical pivot from a model 
of development based on the planned economy to one based on a market economy. After 1978, collective 
agriculture was dismantled, along with rural health risk-pooling schemes, introducing the 1978-1985 
critical juncture, which ended with a clear shift towards commercialization in health. The share of 
government finance in total expenditures for health dropped continuously until 2002, when a conjuncture 
emerged, until 2009 when a comprehensive health reform was launched.  
Throughout the 70 years studied, China achieved substantial economic growth, accompanied by 
greater health service resources. The number of doctors per thousand people increased from 0.62 to 2.31, 
1949-2016, and beds per thousand rose from 0.19 to 5.36 (National Health and Family Planning 
Commission 2017). In urban areas, there were ministerial, provincial, municipal and district hospitals, 
as well as community health institutions in 2018; in rural areas, there were county hospitals, township 
health centres and village clinics. Although county hospitals were based in the county’s capital town, 
they were typically categorized as rural facilities.  
While central and local health agencies were the main governmental bodies in charge of health 
facilities, other government bodies responsible for finance, personnel, price and planning controlled 
critical elements of health policies (Bloom 2004). Furthermore, local governments controlled a 
significant proportion of public spending, and from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s their priority was 
not health but economic development (Gusmano 2015). Key civil society stakeholders might gain the 
sympathy of state bureaucrats, but they were not directly involved in policy making within the state. 
Most crucially, the Chinese Medical Association was annexed by the Ministry of Health after 1949 
(Chen 1989). 
Data sources 
We used a range of materials. Several texts chronicled medicine-related and contextual events for 
the period studied (Chen and Xu 1984, Deng and Cheng 2000). We also analysed official documentation 
of historical statistics and compiled policy documents produced by the Ministry of Health (National 
Family Planning and Health Commission since 2013) and three provincial health gazettes. Published 
memoirs of key actors were collected and analysed. Journals and newspapers were searched and read, 
including the People’s Daily and Chinese Medical Journal. Although we mainly relied on secondary 
sources, we also explored two local archives, as national archives were inaccessible for post-1949 
periods. The lead author accessed the Beijing Municipal Archive and the Archive of Pinggu. Pinggu is a 
suburban district of Beijing and used to be a rural county before 2001. The documents from official 
sources (e.g. yearbooks) and archival materials opened to us were mainly bureaucratic texts, with a 
consequently narrow and official representation of events, and did not necessarily reflect the actual 
practice. Occasionally though, they did provide unexpected insights into the varied perspectives of 





Development of a two-sector system of service delivery (1949-1978) 
Launching urban-biased welfare (1949-1953) 
In 1949, the health service providers in China consisted of urban-focused private medical 
practitioners and hospitals, and public rural primary care facilities, complemented by rural native 
practitioners of traditional healing. While most doctors were private (Ministry of Health 1989), the basic 
structure of the public system reflected two parallel development trajectories of a professionalized 
hospital and public health system, alongside diverse and fragmented private practitioners (Xu, Gorsky 
et al. 2019). After 1949, China adopted the Soviet Model of economic and social development and 
launched its first five-year plan in 1953. This sweeping change of focus from its previous rural-based 
revolution to urban-centred development (Mao 1949) opened a critical juncture for the co-evolution of 
primary care providers and hospitals. 
Between 1949 and 1953, institutions leaning towards the development of hospitals in urban areas 
were either introduced or reinforced. Organisationally, hospitals previously under the Nationalist 
Administration and foreign missionaries were taken over by the new Communist regime (Jiangxi 
Provincial Health Gazette Compiling Committee 1997). Hospitals maintained the direct-access 
outpatient departments created before 1949 (Xu, Gorsky et al. 2019). Financially, one of the most salient 
events was the initiation of Soviet-style workers’ and civil servants’ insurance, respectively the Labour 
Insurance Scheme (LIS) and the Government Insurance Scheme (GIS), in urban areas (Hu 2012). Private 
practitioners were either incorporated into hospitals or grouped into united clinics, whose revenue relied 
solely on fee paying patients (Ministry of Health 1951), and hospitals were the predominant recipients 
of the insurance funds. For the profession, medical education reform with a Soviet-style early clinical 
specialization and shorter school years produced graduates poorly equipped to practice general or family 
medicine, and bound qualified doctors to hospitals (Ministry of Health 1951, Zhang 1953, Qian 1988). 
In rural areas, the government prioritized preventive medicine and local resources remained meagre. 
The Ministry of Health (MOH) repeatedly stressed that the priority of county1 and sub-county health 
facilities was not to provide curative care but to function as a base for all aspects of health work and to 
organize a local health workforce to provide preventive services (i.e. guidance and training in epidemic 
prevention and maternal and child health care) (Ministry of Health 1950, Ministry of Health 1951). By 
1949, the life expectancy at birth was only 35 years, the infant mortality rate was 200 per 1000 live 
births, and the maternal mortality ratio was 1500 per 100,000 live births. Infectious diseases were 
estimated to  contribute to 70% of the loss in life expectancy (Wang, Yu et al. 2015). Due to such 
problems as illiteracy, superstition and poor transportation, health campaigns faced challenges in rural 
areas, and the preventive focus continued to be justifiable (Zhang 1950). According to official 
propaganda, the prioritization of medical care benefits for the urban population was a rational short-term 
strategy given limited resources, and would eventually lead to expansion of coverage to the countryside 
(Zhang 1953).  
Thus, the consequence of this initial critical juncture of 1949-1953 was a health system with separate 
financing, service delivery, professionalization and accountability for rural and urban health services. 
The institutional complex that would essentially last for more than six decades was formed: a 
professional bias towards a hospital-based career; blurred organisational boundaries that precluded 
dependence of hospitals on referrals from primary care doctors; a financing bias towards hospital 
services; and a governance bias where hospital secured a strong political base through their beneficiaries. 
These four sets of institutions underpinned the model of hospital dominance which became adaptively 
                                                 
1 Counties have been an important basic level of administration in China, where residents are predominantly rural. Central and 
provincial policies are usually tailed to local circumstances at the county level. Although county health centres (later county hospitals) 
were based in county seats, which were towns, they were classified as rural health facilities as they were supposed to serve their local 





Self-reinforcing development of urban hospitals (1953-1965) 
Once established, the institutional biases towards urban hospitals prompted a dynamic post-juncture 
process. Insurance coverage led to increased demand for hospital services, while the ability of urbanites 
(wealthier compared to rural population) to pay out-of-pocket also increased hospital utilisation and the 
expenditures of urban insurance schemes rose, resulting in continuous deficits of the funds (Cao 1955, 
Yin 1955, Huang 1957, Liu 1957). The MOH attempted to introduce regional referral networks between 
urban hospitals and primary care facilities (Ministry of Health 1957), however, weak primary care 
capacity and self-funding urban patients inhibited the effectiveness of referral policies in shifting care 
away from hospitals (Ministry of Health 1957). To cope with growing demand, the MOH introduced 
lower-cost substitutes for hospitalisations, including lowered charges and enlarged hospital-based 
outpatient departments (Ministry of Health 1962). As compensation, hospitals received subsidy from 
1954 by retaining a “pharmaceutical sales mark-up”, i.e. a fixed 15% margin on top of purchased prices 
of pharmaceuticals (Zhang and Bian 2007). State-owned enterprises (SOEs) developed their industry-
specific health delivery systems independently from the MOH, employing numbers of health workers 
equal to about 40% of those of MOH facilities in 1957 (Ministry of Health 1989). In short, the post-
junctural development saw hospitals expand organisationally into ambulatory services for common 
illnesses, which could otherwise have been the basis for developing general practice, while their 
increased reliance on pharmaceutical mark-ups and their growth of hospitals in the industrial sector 
seeded further fragmentation in hospital governance. 
Meanwhile, alongside rural collectivization from the late 1950s to 1965, rural medical services were 
being reinforced. These included county hospitals (restructured from county health centres), commune 
health centres (established around 1958, mainly restructured from united clinics), and village health 
workers (peasants with brief training). The MOH focused its financial commitment on county hospitals, 
prompting a rapidly growing number of doctors in these institutions, from 7,454 in 1952 to 52,033 in 
1965 (Ministry of Health 1989). At the same time, the MOH encouraged county governments, rural 
communes and privately-paying patients to fund primary care providers (Ministry of Health 1957, 
Ministry of Health 1959, Ministry of Health 1960, Ministry of Health 1962, Ministry of Health 1965). 
The aftermath of the Great Leap Forward included the continued heavy epidemic disease burden and 
maternal and child health needs that prompted government to allow more flexible use of a medical relief 
fund for maternal and child health also to cover severe infectious diseases (State Council 1963). 
Mortality rate doubled from 12.28 per thousand population in 1950 to 25.43 per thousand population 
(National Health and Family Planning Commission 2017). Three conditions, namely edema, 
gynaecological problems and child malnutrition were particularly prevalent (Zhou 2016). The higher 
priority given to preventive services in rural areas likely also contributed to the relative neglect of 
curative primary care compared to urban hospital services in governments’ financial commitments.  
Overall, post-junctural development generally consolidated the embedding of hospitals in the urban 
socio-economy, and primary care facilities in the rural socio-economy.  
Turning towards rural primary care (1965-1968) 
The convergence of major political events between 1965 and 1968 disrupted the system logic of 
reinforcing urban hospitals, producing a conjuncture favourable to primary care strengthening. In 1965, 
in the “26th June Directive” which was later widely circulated, Chairman Mao reprimanded the MOH 
for ignoring rural health (Zhang 2006). The MOH duly issued a plan to shift the focus of health work to 
rural areas, including organising many hospital-based doctors into mobile medical teams to deliver rural 
care and train village-based “half-peasants-half-doctors”, i.e. peasants with very short-term and simple 
medical training (Commentator 1965). 
Rural health was further politicized during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), with more doctors 
sent down to work in rural areas for long durations, though many were able to remain close to urban 
facilities as Lucas’ analysis of 68 reports on mobile medical teams suggested (Lucas 1982). Furthermore, 




Medical Scheme (CMS), with short-term training for community health workers, dubbed “barefoot 
doctors” (Editorial Office of the Red Flag Magazine 1968, Revolutionary Committee of Leyuan 
Commune 1968). They were predominantly selected from local poor peasants' families, received 
minimal medical training (from several weeks initially to about 2-3 years), acted as the first-contact 
provider for villages for most curative and preventive services, and were paid by their work points as a 
member of the agricultural collective. It is worth noting here that the barefoot doctor programme was as 
much a response to demand for health care in low-resource rural areas from the bottom up as a national 
model promoted from above (Zhou 2016, Gross 2018). 
The policy change was not just about substance but also discourse, representing the ideology of the 
Cultural Revolution. According to a 1968 article promoting the CMS endorsed by Mao, “poor and lower-
middle peasants should hold the power of rural medicine” (Revolutionary Committee of Leyuan 
Commune 1968). The urban doctors mobilised to work in rural areas were not to be the experts, but 
rather were considered an ideologically compromised bourgeois, in need of re-education to serve the 
majority population of peasants. Among their key tasks was to facilitate the training of the new health 
workforce, the barefoot doctors. The emphasis on leadership of the peasants essentially reinforced a 
community-based, low-cost model of health delivery and ruled out a strong bureaucratic stake (i.e. 
ministerial leadership) in rural health development. Essentially, the barefoot doctor programme and the 
Cooperative Medical Scheme constituted an echo of the 1930s community health approach initiated in 
state medicine (Xu, Gorsky et al. 2019). 
Resistance and adaptation during implementation (1968-1978) 
The conjunctural efforts eventually extended primary care coverage to most of the country’s 
population, but were constrained by the system logic already established at the 1949-1953 critical 
juncture. The CMS’s level of benefits and provider payment were not comparable with those of the urban 
insurance schemes, though it did receive some government fiscal support in the 1970s (Ministry of 
Health 1974). In reality, at least some of the urban-trained doctors were providing important support in 
the development of barefoot doctors under the peculiar circumstances of the Cultural Revolution (Gross 
2018). This reliance of primary care professional training on the extreme circumstances of the Cultural 
Revolution reflected the prior lack of institutionalization and the challenge of reorienting the medical 
education system towards rural primary care. There was resistance to efforts to shift urban human 
resources to rural areas, given the pro-urban financing and organisational institutions established in the 
1950s. For instance, the Beijing Municipal Health Bureau (1973, 1973) proposed postponing posting 
away urban medical professionals, as urban hospitals suffered from serious overload and chaos affecting 
“care-seeking of workers and peasants” due to staff shortages. Nation-wide, the proportion of doctors in 
urban areas and urban hospitals was consistently higher than in rural areas between 1965 and 1975, with 
the gap widening between 1970 and 1976 (Ministry of Health 1989).  
Within rural health facilities, the increase in the numbers of county hospital professionals slowed, 
and township health centres received substantially more college-trained doctors after 1968 (Ministry of 
Health 1989). However, this did not simply mean primary care strengthening. Township health centres 
were developed into miniature hospitals to extend substantial clinical services to rural residents, and had 
0.7 million beds by 1978, compared to 1 million in all hospitals (including both urban and county) 
(National Health and Family Planning Commission 2017). Wider reform of medical education during 
the Cultural Revolution failed, with formal medical training shortened to three years and students 
recruited with little prior education, producing poorly trained graduates (Luo and Sun 1992). These 
graduates were not capable of establishing rural primary care on an equal professional status with 
hospital doctors. Furthermore, few of these graduates had begun as barefoot doctors. 71% of all the 1,652 
barefoot doctors who had worked in Pinggu since 1965 remained as barefoot doctors by 1975, while 
only 132 had left for further education, not necessarily related to medicine (Pinggu Health Bureau 1975).  
Thus, technical upgrading of medicines and services provided by the barefoot doctors was very 
limited, and indeed not seen as worthwhile by the radical political leaders under the ideological climate 
of the Cultural Revolution. Instead, given the severe resource constraints, a political campaign was 
launched in support of cheaper traditional healing through Chinese herbal medicine and acupuncture. 




were encouraged. For instance, 67 local herbal pharmacies were built in Pinggu County (Pinggu Health 
Bureau 1986). Evidence suggests public reaction varied substantially. Local party spokespeople during 
the Cultural Revolution claimed that patients were satisfied with herbal medicine (Party Branch of 
Heidouyu Brigade at Huangsongyu Commune 1977). However, recent local oral history evidence 
suggests that far from trusting herbal therapies, many preferred Western medicines, which usually 
offered faster resolution (Fang 2012). It is probable that not all the rural population appreciated the value 
of low-cost primary care. However, propaganda during the Cultural Revolution lauded the CMS and the 
barefoot doctors as new models of health services, making it difficult to criticise their limited range and 
quality of drugs and services. Indeed, Deng Xiaoping (who after 1978 replaced Mao as China’s top 
leader) was attacked by radicals as ideologically wrong in 1974 for saying to foreign visitors that 
barefoot doctors would be upgraded into professionals (Zhang and Unschuld 2008). It thus seems that 
the earlier association of professional education with privileged urban class made it ideologically 
challenging to integrate them into the new model of rural primary care. 
Overall, the 1968-1978 post-juncture developments saw resilience of the pro-hospital institutions in 
urban areas laid down in the 1950s, and rural primary care established as the antithesis of hospitals. 
Rural primary care was weakly institutionalized amongst professionals, ultimately producing reversion 
to the earlier trajectory. Moreover, rural primary care and urban hospitals provided an overlapping range 
of services (both inpatient and ambulatory), foreshadowing later competition. Despite these issues, an 
epidemiologic transition took place during the Maoist period. In 1981, life expectancy at birth reached 
67.9 years (up from 35 years in 1949), and the infant mortality rate fell to 34.7 per 1000 live births 
(compared to 200 per 1000 live births in 1949) (National Health and Family Planning Commission 2017). 
Adaption and path dependence during reforms (1978-2018) 
Changes favouring hospitals and technology (1978-1985) 
After 1978, as China entered a social transition towards a market economy, health policies had to 
adapt to new circumstances. Health policy makers were challenged by public funding constraints and 
increased requirements for technological advancement (Henderson 1989). They also faced a sharp 
increase in demand for health care from a rapidly urbanizing population (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China 2012). The collapse of the agrarian collective economy meant additional difficulty in sustaining 
rural health services. Decisions on how to address these challenges created another critical juncture. 
The previous strong bureaucratic orientation of the MOH and established professional institutions 
favoring hospitals contributed to the dominance of a strong hospital-bias in the MOH’s policy response 
to the situation. First, the MOH actively restored the technical capacity of hospitals believed to have 
been harmed during the Cultural Revolution (Tang and Meng 2004). Priorities were given to establishing 
advanced medical centres as regional technical centres (Henderson 1989) and strengthening county 
hospitals (Ministry of Health 1980, Ministry of Health 1980).  
Second, financing reform was implemented to address health facility deficits, mainly to the benefit 
of hospitals. As the CMS collapsed along with collective agriculture (Duckett 2012), the MOH allowed 
privatization of village clinics (State Council 1985). It tightened budgetary constraints on public health 
facilities and encouraged them to seek extra-budgetary revenue by allowing management autonomy to 
redistribute surplus (Ministy of Health, Ministry of Finance et al. 1979, State Council 1985). Non-basic 
services (principally technological interventions) started to be priced above cost (Liu, Liu et al. 2000) in 
order to subsidize health facilities. These policies benefited hospitals in both capital development and 
clinicians' incomes (Pinggu Health Bureau 1986, Liu, Xu et al. 1996). 
Third, human resource policies reinforced the hospitals’ advantage. Pre-Cultural-Revolution 
hierarchies were restored in medical colleges in 1977, supplying hospitals with an ever larger number of 
doctors (Editorial 1977). Township health centres experienced an immediate exodus of their best doctors 
due to lack of income, benefits and professional prospects (Zhang 1982). The MOH abolished the title 
of “barefoot doctor” in 1985 and kept only 0.6 million “village doctors” who passed a certification 




With the clear establishment of market-oriented reform, 1985 marked the completion of the critical 
juncture underway since 1978. After the Cultural Revolution, the MOH reverted back to prioritising 
hospitals, partially restoring the situation in the early 1950s. There was little organized rural action 
against the fall of the CMS, probably due to its embeddedness in collective agriculture—something rural 
residents seemed ready to sacrifice in a fundamental decollectivization reform (Duckett 2012). Policies 
addressed the short-term financial needs of hospitals by allowing greater autonomy in revenue 
generation, surplus retention and internal distribution. In contrast, rural health financing and human 
resources were allowed to deteriorate rapidly, underlining the limitations of the prior efforts to strengthen 
primary care.  
Evolution of the two-sector structure (1985-2002) 
A dynamic post-juncture process quickly unfolded, along with further commercialization policies 
(State Council 1989, State Council 1992, State Council 2000). Revenue-based bonuses were adopted in 
health facilities to incentivize doctors to provide more services and facility managers to increase service 
efficiency (Liu and Mills 2005). A new Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance Scheme replaced the 
original LIS and the requirement for referral to hospital services was replaced with competition across 
all levels of care (State Council 1998). Although recognizing the severe challenges facing rural primary 
care, the MOH failed to either secure direct fiscal subsidy or re-establish risk-pooling funds (Ministry 
of Health 1990, General Office of Central Committee of Communist Party of China and General Office 
of State Council 1993). 
The set of financial incentives for revenue generation mentioned above, together with enhanced 
competition between facilities, encouraged hospital managers and doctors to adopt expensive 
technological procedures and medicines and induce unnecessary medical demand and utilisation (Liu 
and Mills 2005). Both the numbers of beds and hospital doctors increased by more than 50%, 1985 to 
2002 (National Health and Family Planning Commission 2017). A medical equipment race emerged as 
a result of competition for the revenue that could be gained from high-technology medicine. Reports 
from local areas suggested that the number of CT scanners in hospitals amounted to 3 to 8 times the 
planned quota (Li 1997). Public hospitals achieved such development with little direct government 
subsidy (about 7.6% of total hospital revenue by 2002) (Ministry of Health 2003). Pharmaceutical sales 
accounted for 47% of the total revenue of comprehensive hospitals under health departments (Ministry 
of Health 2003). 
While village doctors generally lost the support from the CMS and relied on profits from drug sales 
to earn a living (Bloom 1998), township health centres were trapped in a vicious cycle of underutilisation 
and financial deficits (Liu, Xu et al. 1996). Dangerous premises, outdated equipment and shortages of 
professionals were commonplace among them (Liu, Xu et al. 1996). Their proportion of staff lacking 
qualifications rose from 40% in 1983 to 58% in 1988 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 1989).  
Overall, the period from 1985 to 2002 witnessed a continuous downstream evolution of an 
institutional balance that favoured hospitals. Failed efforts to bring back the CMS and secure substantial 
budget allocation for primary care facilities during this period meant the primary care facilities, in order 
to survive financially, had to compete directly with hospitals for patients, and hospitals continued to 
benefit from the institutional primacy established in the 1950s. The two-sector model of urban hospital-
focus and rural primary-care-focus started to be converted to a model where hospitals became dominant 
overall. During this period, there was evidence that chronic, non-communicable diseases (NCDs) had 
become the main cause of premature death and morbidity, which implied the importance of stronger 
primary care to prevent NCDs and manage conditions at early stages of disease progression (World Bank 
1992). However, the inability to strengthen primary care around the end of the 21st century paved the 
way towards rapidly increasing pressure on health services from chronic patients after 2000. 
Turning towards universal health coverage (2002-2009) 
The period from 2002 to 2009 constituted another conjuncture. An outbreak of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread to 24 provinces within 2 months in mainland China (Wang, Yu et 




neglecting health security, and adding weight to international criticism of China’s lack of health risk-
pooling (World Health Organization 2000). A new administration highlighted the importance of heath 
along with improved social welfare, and launched two major social health insurance schemes for 
previously uncovered urban and rural residents. In 2009 it implemented a milestone reform aiming at 
achieving universal basic health coverage by 2020 (Central Committee of Communist Party of China 
and State Council 2009). Primary care strengthening was an important component of the reform, with 
the goal of satisfying the demand for services addressing all common illnesses at primary care facilities. 
As the social health insurance schemes rolled out, the share of out-of-pocket payment in total health 
expenditures reduced from 60% in 2001 to 37.5% in 2009 (China National Health Development 
Research Center 2017). However, greater financial leverage was not used effectively to strengthen 
primary care. Social health insurance prioritized reimbursement for hospitalizations (Yip and Hsiao 2009) 
and further encouraged competition among providers (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance et al. 
2007). Besides, while subsidies were provided to primary care facilities (as well as hospitals), the reform 
also introduced a payroll cap for primary care, reducing the financial motivation for expanding clinical 
services (State Council 2009).  
Community health services institutions developed rapidly and became ubiquitous primary care 
facilities in urban areas (Bhattacharyya, Yin et al. 2011). However, their prescriptions were limited to 
essential drugs (State Council 2009). A new set of essential public health services, with performance 
targets focusing on number of services rather than outcomes, were introduced as a key responsibility of 
primary care facilities (State Council 2009), competing with staff time for clinical care. The reform 
masterplan emphasised the training of general practitioners for primary care facilities (State Council 
2009). In terms of governance, while policies on primary care reform were to be implemented 
immediately, the MOH had limited ability to control hospital behavior, reflecting fragmented policy 
making and the imbalance in power between hospitals and primary care facilities. 
Overall, the 2002-2009 conjuncture saw primary care strengthening clearly put on the policy and 
financing agenda, though some restrictive financial and organisational policies ran counter to their 
development; meanwhile, the power of hospitals to generate revenue was not constrained.  
Increasing hospital dominance amid health system reform (2009-2018) 
In the post-junctural development, social health insurance schemes reached almost universal 
coverage, and out-of-pocket payment further reduced, from 37.5% in 2009 to 28.8% in 2016 (China 
National Health Development Research Center 2017). However, the hospital-centric structure 
introduced in the early 1950s and reinvigorated after 1978 proved difficult to revise. The health system 
thus seemed to experience a “lock-in”, as resources and patients became increasingly concentrated in 
hospitals despite the reform’s aim of primary care strengthening.  
The medical schools started to reform higher medical education with early specialization and 
introduced general practice programmes, but graduates did not see primary care as a promising career. 
A survey of 546 medical graduates from a prestigious medical school showed that none went to primary 
care facilities (Fu 2011). Another study on a special contract-based programme targeting rural facilities 
showed that only 1.6% of graduates eventually employed in primary care facilities after graduation liked 
their work (Hu, Chen et al. 2018). The difficulty these new graduates had in finding satisfactory jobs in 
general practice was attributable to the long-term orientation of medical professionalisation towards 
hospitals consolidated in the 1950s. 
Financing reform aiming at decommercialisation faced greater implementation challenges in 
hospitals than in primary care. Most provinces started to remove drug mark-ups in public hospitals in 
2017—eight years after this started in primary care facilities (National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, Ministry of Finance et al. 2017). The delay was probably attributable to the fragmentation 
of decision-making among multiple ministries responsible for either providing an additional funding 
subsidy or increasing the prices of physician services to replace the markup in cost recovery. Hence, the 
hospital share of pharmaceutical revenue in all health facilities grew from 61.6% to 76.3% between 2009 




Health Development Research Center 2017, National Health and Family Planning Commission 2017). 
The actions of corporate interests seemed to make reform more challenging. Scandals about “kickbacks” 
that drug manufacturers and distributers gave doctors to promote their products further revealed that 
reliance on the drug distribution system to cross-subsidize physicians had significantly normalized such 
illegal practice (Huang 2013, Zheng 2013). Organisationally, integrated delivery systems were 
established across various levels of facilities, with the intention that hospitals would support primary 
care providers. However, the hospitals were uninterested in building such capacity of primary care 
providers, as their income would suffer if patients went instead to primary care (Liang, He et al. 2016).  
Self-reinforcing dynamics unfolded. There was low patient confidence in, and low demand for, 
primary care services (Wang, Gusmano et al. 2011), due to previous lack of highly-qualified primary 
care professionals--a result of long-standing medical education policies. The growing income gap 
between hospital doctors and primary care doctors due to asymmetric reform development also 
contributed to reduced motivation of some professionals to work in primary medical care, eventually 
giving rise to a brain drain of experienced doctors to hospitals (Zhou, Li et al. 2014). Motivation to 
provide medical services was affected by the fixed salary for primary care facilities, while additional 
resources disproportionately flowed towards hospitals, following the increasing volume of services (Xu 
and Mills 2017).  
Towards the end of the period, a number of policy revisions took place. A new National Healthcare 
Security Administration was established, incorporating the functions of pricing, procurement and 
payment for all insurance schemes (Central Committee of Communist Party of China 2018). Such an 
integrated governance structure of financing could permit strategic purchasing to shift the balance 
towards primary care. Policies on enhancing the professional standard, status and salary of general 
practice were also issued (General Office of the State Council 2018). Several policies restricting the 
development of primary care facilities were removed or loosened. For instance, Beijing standardised the 
pharmaceutical catalogue across primary care facilities and secondary hospitals (Beijing Municipal 
Government 2017), essentially lifting prescription restrictions for primary care facilities. How these 
latest policy changes will influence the balance of care remains to be seen, and it is clear that resources 
and services continued to be concentrated in hospitals (Xu and Mills 2019) 
Discussion 
Limitations and strengths 
As the study is about overall historical processes, we have had to limit our analysis to the most 
typical and available cases at an aggregate level. Huge variations exist in China and cannot be well 
captured within the space of this article. Another important limitation is our restricted access to historical 
archives and lack of use of oral history, so we mainly built our analysis on secondary sources and official 
publications. This restricted our ability to detect the agency of some key individuals and organisations. 
Nevertheless, the study was innovative in bringing an historical-institutionalist lens to China’s 
contemporary problem of hospital dominance.  
Findings 
Following our analytical framework, Table 2 summarises the dynamics in China of the coevolution 












1949-1953: Government priority in health 
development shifted towards urban insurance 
and urban hospitals, which created strong 
interest coalitions with hospitals. Rural health 
care focused on preventive care and did not 
benefit from the new insurance schemes. 
1978-1985: Focus on developing medical 
technology under tight fiscal constraints prompted 
the introduction of strong financial incentives to 
generate extra-budgetary revenue by cross-
subsidization from high-cost technology and 
medicines. The structure favoured hospital 
development, while rural reform left the collective-
based and weakly institutionalized rural primary 





1953-1965: Urban demand for hospitals grew, 
prompting further expansion of outpatient 
departments and industrial health services. 
Cheap and de-professionalized primary care 
started to be developed in rural areas, along 
with collectivization. The embedding of 
hospitals in urban socio-economy and primary 
care facilities in rural socio-economy became 
consolidated. 
1985-2002: Increased hospital autonomy and 
limited financial subsidies drove hospitals to 
develop a model based on heavy use of 
technologies and expensive medicines, while the 
primary care sector suffered from continued 
financial difficulties; rapidly widening gaps 
between primary care and hospital facilities. 
Conjuncture 1965-1968: The “June 26th Directive” pushed 
for the prioritization of rural health care, sent 
urban doctors to rural areas, popularized the 
rural Cooperative Medical Scheme and 
barefoot doctors. The rural primary care 
program became rhetorically re-established on 
the ideology of Cultural Revolution. 
2002-2009: The SARS crisis and change of 
administration opened a window for disruptive 
policies. Policy guidelines shifted towards 
universal coverage, in which primary care was 
emphasized as a key area for strengthening. The 
reform fell short of developing substantial and 




1968-1978: Policies to shift professional 
doctors to rural areas faced resistance. Primary 
care policies eventually placed a further 
emphasised on rural self-sufficiency with 
strong rhetorical packaging, leaving rural 
primary care weakly institutionalized. 
2009-2018: Greater control was introduced of 
primary care expenditure and services, but 
Although restrictive policies at primary care 
facilities had been introduced, hospital payment 
reform was delayed. Continued lack of human 
capital accumulation in primary care affected 
patient confidence in and demand for community 
services. Rapidly growing government financial 
input support in health channeled funding 
disproportionately towards hospitals and relatively 
weakened primary care providers. 
 
 
Figure 1. A model of cyclic path dependence 
Each cycle started with a critical juncture rising amid a radically changing societal context (see 
Figure 1), where institutions favouring hospitals were initiated or renewed. This critical juncture was 
followed by a downstream process of self-reinforcement enhancing the hospitals’ dominance. Later in 
each cycle, a conjuncture emerged to revise the previous system logic, coming into the existing pro-
hospital institutional environment, that exhibited strong resilience. Hence, the repeated conjunctures 
failed to build primary care facilities on strong institutional grounds, and led to post-juncture processes 
which prompted the development of primary care as the antithesis of hospitals in both cycles. The 
weakness of such institutionalization turned into disadvantage for primary care when the next cycle 
started.  




constraints from pre-existing system logic, characterise the coevolution of hospitals and primary care 
providers in China, suggesting that the path dependence exhibited in China’s health system does not 
preclude major policy changes. Indeed, primary care strengthening was incorporated into key 
government policies at the conjunctures discussed above, unlike the repeated frustration of efforts to 
develop national health insurance in the United States (Hacker 1998). From our analysis, a key factor 
was the tendency to respond to short-term policy needs at critical junctures, which created potentially 
adverse and irreversible consequences. Neither continuity (Lucas 1982) nor radical changes (Huang 
2013) suggested in earlier literature were sufficient to explain contemporary hospital dominance in 
China.  
Instead, this imbalance is to a large extent the result of four interrelated sets of institutions formed 
in the 1950s and reshaped over the years. Professionally, a strong bonding of professional doctors was 
forged with hospitals. Organisationally, large outpatient departments allowed hospitals to profit from 
directly-accessing patients and precluded interdependence between hospitals and primary care providers. 
Financially, an urban-bias with a revenue-generating incentive and technology-based cross-subsidization, 
introduced to encourage expansion of medical services, channelled resources primarily to hospitals. In 
terms of governance, hospital growth went beyond effective policy control amid a generally fragmented 
regulatory landscape. These four sets of institutions provided the model of hospital development based 
on technology, extra-budgetary revenue, and strong backing (or demand) from powerful interests. This 
structure has been adaptively self-replicating.  
Policy implications 
The growing challenge of covering China’s health expenditures by continuously increasing public 
spending (Zhai, Goss et al.) against a backdrop of economic slowdown is likely to open up another 
conjuncture aiming to increase the efficiency of health systems and contain cost escalation. Recently, 
China’s leadership has made strong political commitment to prioritization of people’s health in 
development with a focus on primary care (Xinhua Agency 2016). As historical experiences suggest, 
political commitment is important, yet dealing with the various challenges facing primary care 
strengthening in China requires systemic solutions. 
The first priority is to contain hospital growth in order to break down the self-reinforcement of 
hospital centrism and allow the fiscal space for primary care development. The recent rapid expansion 
of hospitals reflected weak regional health planning on one hand, and inflationary payment mechanisms 
on the other. Payment reform should be prioritized to contain the demand of inpatient services. Revising 
the high-powered incentives seems critical in controlling supply-induced demand. Further, bundling of 
payment between hospital outpatient services and primary care providers may be needed to incentivize 
hospitals to transfer services to primary care where costs can be lower if patients are managed well. 
Hospitals should be repositioned to focus less on delivering a large volume of highly specialized 
treatment and more on quality of care, health management and support for primary care. 
Second, strengthening of primary care requires both demand-side and supply-side efforts. Both 
sufficiently high salaries and promising career paths are needed to attract and retain capable staff at 
primary care facilities. A substantial number of highly qualified general practitioners are needed, as well 
as coherent human resources policies which provide salary and career prospects for primary care 
providers comparable to those of hospitals (Keck and Reed 2012, Macinko and Harris 2015). A team-
based approach in primary care, as in Brazil, involving both highly qualified primary care professionals 
and community-based health workers, seems a sensible option for China in the near future. Such an 
approach not only uses a limited number of general practitioners efficiently, but also connects health 
workers in the community with health professionals (Harris and Haines 2010). Primary care facilities 
should be incrementally charged with coordinating care for residents. On the demand side, the value of 
primary care should be demonstrated with easy access to services that address the multiple health and 
functional conditions widely seen among the elderly and chronically ill patients as China becomes an 
aged society. 
Third, more equitable pooling and strategic purchasing is needed along with more streamlined and 




National Healthcare Security Administration should shift purchasing of services towards addressing 
population health needs. Further consolidation and equalization is needed to allow rural and urban 
primary care facilities adequate resources. On the other hand, an administrative structure at the local 
level with sufficient authority to coordinate the various sets of institutions encompassing both hospitals 
and primary care facilities is needed. Given the interrelatedness of the reform elements mentioned above, 
it is probably better to start reform bottom up, from local areas. The central and local governments could 
work together to establish special health reform zones, where local leaders can have substantial 
autonomy to coordinate stakeholders and implement systemic reform. 
Fourth, the doctors and patients need to be engaged more clearly than has historically been the case 
in future reform. We have argued above that the divergence between professional doctors and primary 
care contributed to contemporary weak primary care. Currently, doctors are mostly hired by public 
facilities and are rarely outspoken in organised ways about their interests, reflecting substantial barriers 
to open discussion about salary levels. A possible result of strong dominance of public purchasing in 
such a system during a relatively constrained economic period is the potential for overemphasis on cost 
containment of public expenditures. Gaal and McKee (2004) argued that informal payment became 
prevalent in Hungary because “the channels of exit and voice are blocked”. International experiences in 
this area suggests the importance of the buy-in of medical professionals to introducing pro-primary-care 
changes. In Thailand, a rural doctors’ association played a critical role in advocating for equitable 
payment for rural primary care doctors (Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaibon 2003). Experiences from rich 
countries in the area of integrated care where  doctors change from concentrating on treatment of 
episodic care to integrated care also suggest the importance of leadership of clinical professionals 
(Amelung, Chase et al. 2017). These international experiences show the importance of ownership by 
medical professionals in introducing pro-primary-care changes.  
Finally, given the intractability of the challenges facing primary care strengthening, disruptive 
technologies may have an important role to play. The lesson from the 1960s, in rapidly rolling out 
services when professional care was limited is to make good use of resources that can be reallocated 
relatively independently of reforms. Artificial intelligence and telemedicine offer new opportunities of 
“barefoot doctors of our time” in overcoming the path dependence of hospital-centrism. Meanwhile, as 
our paper has demonstrated, such disruption, if managed problematically, might also further alienate 
doctors and undermine the professional basis of primary care. 
Conclusion 
This study has explored the institutional coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers in 
China between 1949 and 2018 through the lens of path dependence analysis. We constructed a dynamic 
and cyclic path dependence model to explain the formation of hospital dominance and imbalance 
between hospitals and primary care providers. There have been two main cycles of path dependence 
involving a process of “critical juncture — post-juncture development — conjuncture — post-juncture 
development” since 1949, which eventually resulted in the professional, financial, governance-related 
and organizational institutions underlying the balance between hospitals and primary care providers. The 
development of an institutional complex related to the balance between hospitals and primary care 
providers suggested a dominance of hospitals underpinning the coevolution of hospitals and primary 
care providers.  
Our findings suggest that primary care strengthening is unlikely to be successful without a 
comprehensive set of policy reforms at both central and especially local levels, coordinated and sustained 
over a substantial period. Amid drastic social transformation, it is important to maintain a strong 
commitment towards primary care, as neglect during rapid changes might be very difficult to reverse. 
The apparent path dependence of hospital centrism in China was not rooted in the absence of windows 
of policy change. Instead, one key source of path dependence seems to be the pre-existing system logic 
that survived the conjunctures. A fundamental shift of balance from hospitals to primary care providers 
requires a strong coalition of professional, bureaucratic and community stakeholders and a policy mix 




Overall, a path dependence framework was helpful in making sense of the persistence of hospital-
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